Definitions used
throughout the courses

A market with two mutually exclusive outcomes, such as YES and NO, whose settlement rule is defined before trading.

A position that pays a fixed amount when its named outcome occurs, such as one YES share.

One YES share plus one NO share; one side pays at settlement regardless of which outcome wins.

A probability-like reading of an outcome-share price divided by its maximum payout; it is a market signal, not an objective fact.

Assets locked before a future obligation so the winning side can be paid without creating value at settlement.

The state transition that uses a finalized outcome to make winning positions claimable and losing positions unpayable.

An order that executes only at its stated price or a better one, leaving the trade conditional on available counterparties.

The highest standing buy price and lowest standing sell price in an order book.

The best ask minus the best bid; it is a visible cost of immediacy and a signal about liquidity.

The quantity available at each price level; depth determines how far a large order moves its average execution price.

The matching rule that compares price first and arrival time second when prices are equal.

A state in which only part of an order finds a counterparty and the remainder stays open or is canceled by its policy.

The price of the order already waiting in the book, used as the execution price when a new order crosses it.

A deterministic state machine that turns crossed orders into fills and balance changes under explicit priority rules.

An order that prioritizes immediate execution and accepts the prices offered by current book liquidity.

Total execution value divided by executed quantity; it reveals the real price after an order consumes multiple levels.

Ending an old order and re-entering with a new price or size, usually receiving a new time priority.

A rule that stops one account's own buy and sell orders from matching to create artificial volume or price signals.

The quantity of each asset held by a pool; the reserve ratio determines the next marginal quote.

An x·y=k curve that constrains reserve changes; fees can make the product grow over time.

The gap between an expected quote and the executed result, usually shaped by trade size and pool depth.

A participant who deposits assets into a pool, earns a share of fees, and carries inventory-composition risk.

Trading across markets with different prices so pool reserves move toward an external reference price.

The execution-price movement caused by a trade changing pool reserves; it is distinct from the fee charged.

The average input divided by output for a swap, rather than the instantaneous spot price before the trade.

The difference between an LP's current inventory value and a hold-only benchmark, often realized when liquidity is withdrawn.

All token units the system recognizes as existing, including units that are still locked.

Units currently available to transfer, trade, or use; it is normally no greater than total supply.

An account or role allowed to invoke minting logic and write new units into total supply.

Tokens already allocated to a schedule but released into usable balance only after time and a claim action.

A reduction in a holder's relative share when total supply grows or other holders receive additional units.

Locked balance already counted in total supply that may enter circulation later and create future sell pressure.

Removing units from a holder balance while reducing total supply, rather than sending them to a dead address.

A control scheme that requires a threshold of authorized signers before a privileged action executes.

A state transition that moves a privileged role such as minting from one controller to another.

An encoded target, action, and parameter that can be voted on, queued, and executed as a state change.

Balances and delegation captured when a proposal is created, preventing temporary changes from rewriting an active vote.

Assigning representation to another member without creating tokens or allowing the same power to be counted twice.

The minimum participation required for a proposal to continue; it is separate from whether support beats opposition.

An observable delay between approval and execution that creates a review and cancellation window.

Protocol-controlled assets that move only when an authorized governance action executes.

A safety path that blocks a queued operation before execution without erasing its vote history.

The protocol's price-based estimate of deposited assets; it changes as the oracle input changes.

Debt divided by collateral value, usually constrained below a maximum to leave a buffer for price movement and execution friction.

A compressed risk reading of collateral, debt, and the liquidation threshold; below 1.00 often means liquidation is allowed.

The collateral price at which the health factor reaches the liquidation boundary, not a forecast of where price must go.

A participant who repays debt with their own assets after a risk boundary is crossed and receives collateral under protocol rules.

Debt that remains after all available collateral cannot cover it; reserves, insurance, or socialized loss rules must absorb the gap.

Cryptographic authorization over specific transaction fields; it does not prove balance or finality.

An account sequence number that orders transactions and blocks replay of the same authorization.

The deterministic computation that turns old balances and nonces into a new state after a valid transaction.

A digest of account state that helps nodes verify they reached the same execution result.

A set of broadcast transactions waiting for block execution; pending does not mean confirmed.

A newly signed version using the same nonce to replace a pending transaction before execution.

A digest committing to the parent block, transaction fingerprints, and resulting state root.

Later blocks built on top of a block, providing a reorganization buffer rather than a universal finality guarantee.

A consensus guarantee that a state is safe for downstream applications to depend on.

A mechanism that writes an outside-world fact into an on-chain system through sources, reports, and dispute rules.

A period in which participants can dispute an initial report, usually with a bond and arbitration process.

The consistency, timeliness, and verifiability of outside evidence; it changes risk without deciding the final outcome automatically.

A participant who turns outside evidence into a bonded, accountable onchain claim.

Assets locked up to make a future claim costly to fake and to fund the consequence of being wrong.

The state transition that makes a reported outcome authoritative for downstream settlement.

An explicit interface action that lets a downstream market read a finalized oracle result and begin settlement once.

A token designed to stay near a reference unit through collateral, redemption, arbitrage, reserves, or another explicit mechanism—not through its name.

The reference value a protocol aims to track, such as one dollar; a target is a design goal, not proof that the market has honored it.

The price produced by external trading; it can diverge from a target and is not rewritten by protocol wording.

Burning stablecoin units to withdraw collateral under explicit rules; capacity depends on reserves, fees, price inputs, and limits.

Issuing fewer stablecoin liabilities than the collateral value, leaving a buffer for price movement and execution friction.

A sustained divergence between a stablecoin's market price and its target; arbitrage creates incentives without guaranteeing liquidity or reserves.

The amount of redeemable reserves relative to outstanding stablecoin supply; a loss does not automatically erase liabilities.

Many holders attempting to exit around the same time, turning reserves, liquidity, and redemption order into a system boundary.

Value redistributed because someone can see intent, control transaction ordering, or compose execution differently; it is not automatically synonymous with an illegal attack.

A shared observation surface for pending transaction intent before execution; visibility gives searchers time to prepare competing orders.

A searcher trades before and after a user's swap to try to capture part of the price movement caused by that swap.

The least output a swapper will accept; if execution falls below it, the transaction reverts instead of silently accepting worse terms.

A trade placed after a user's transaction changes the pool state, attempting to take the other side of the new price; profit still has to appear on the ledger.

A path that keeps transaction intent out of the public mempool, reducing one visibility route without removing builder or proposer trust boundaries.